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THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THE THREAT THAT IT
POSES TO OUR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
PINCKNY G. McELwwm.*
The major part of this treatise is directed to the invalidity of thc
purported 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United State.
and the circumstances which caused honorable men - U. S. Senaton
and Representatives - who doubtless did not consider their conduct
to be unethical or dishonorable, to "take the law into their own hands"
to accomplish what they considered to be in the best interests of the;
Nation. But, in my dissertation on the 14th Amendment and the
circumstances of its purported adoption, I am using it as a vehicle
to demonstrate that under the present law of the United States, a,
decided by the Supreme Court, our entire Democratic-Republican
form of Government, our system of checks and balances, our way
of life, is faced with a threat of utter destruction. I bring this danger
to the attention of the citizens and the Congress of the United States
while there is yet time to provide a remedy.
At the outset I wish to say that this article is not motivated by a
dissatisfaction evidenced in some quarters with recent rulings of the
Supreme Court of the United States; nor am I advocating any effort
to have the 14th Amendment declared invalid, although I deplore the
means that were employed to obtain the end. I have a sincere con-
cern for the future of our form of Government in times of great
national economic stress, resulting from the legal precedents establish-
ed by the irregular procedures attending the adoption of the 14th
Amendment. Lenin, Hitler, Moussolini, and the others did not b('-
come dictators without widespread support of many short-sighted
people.
The able and wise patriots who drafted our Constitution were carc-
ful to protect its provisions against actions of a temporary majority
of the Congress by requiring for its arhendment not only a two-thirds
approval by both Houses of the Congress, but ratification by three-
fourths of the States. A study of the history of the 14th Amendment
reveals the irregular manner in which these requirements were over-
come, and a consideration of the precedents established thereby re-
veals the danger to our form of government.
The Civil War was fought over the asserted right of the Southern
*Member of the Houston, Texas; St. Louis, Missouri, and Washington, D. C.,
Bars.
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States to secede from the Union. The Southern States claimed
they had such a right. The President, the Congress, and the North-
ern States denied that the Southern States had any such right under
the Constitution of the United States. As Mr. Lincoln said, the
aim of the Federal Government was to preserve the Union first; to
preserve the Union without slavery, to preserve the Union with
slavery if it must be, but the "Union forever." This issue was
decided on the battlefield and the Union Army upheld the position
taken by all departments of the Federal Government, i. e., that the
Southern States had no right to secede and had never been out of
the Union. Incidentally, Mr. Lincoln recognized that his emancipa-
tion of the slaves was a war measure and that it would require a
Constitutional amendment to abolish slavery after the end of the War.
Mr. Lincoln was steadfast in his position that the Southern States
had never left the Union, although individual officials and soldiers
of the South may have forfeited some rights; but not the States
whose rights were fixed by the Constitution and thus beyond the
power of Congress to add or detract. As stated by George Tickner
Curtis in Volume II, Page 342, of his famous History of the
Constitution -
After the Civil War was ended, the Constitution was left just
as it was before the War began; the United States had just
the same sovereign rights as before and no others.
The House on July 22, 1861, and the Senate on July 25, 1861,
adopted resolutions both resolving to maintain the Constitution in
the rebellious States and to maintain the Union and the rights of
the States unimpaired.
In the Proclamation of President Lincoln' of December 8, 1863,
he offered "pardon to all those who swear henceforth to support the
Constitution of the United States and that those who, accepting this
amnesty, shall have taken the oath of allegiance, each being a qualified
voter by the election laws of the several States immediately before
the so-called secession and excluding all others, shall reestablish a
State government, which shall be republican in form and nowise con-
travening said oath; such shall be recognized as a true government
of the State."
On February 1, 1865, the 13th Amendment to the Constitution to
abolish slavery was proposed and passed by Congress. On April 9,
1865, General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General Grant at Ap-
pomattox Court House. General Johnston surrendered to General
1. 13 STAT. 737 (1863).
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Sherman at Durham Station April 26, 1865. In 40 days after the
surrender of General Johnston there was not a single Confederate
soldier in arms. Submission to the authority of the United States
was complete. Postal service and tax collections resumed.
On December 18, 1865,2 General Grant reported to Congress that
the South had accepted defeat and had accepted authority of the
Federal Government.
President Lincoln prepared a proclamation to restore North Caro-
lina to its proper position as a State but it was not yet issued before
his death. At the first meeting of the Cabinet after his death it was
read and unanimously adopted as the policy of the Administration.
Mr. Lincoln was assassinated on April 14, 1865, and died April 15,
1865. Andrew Johnson took the oath and succeeded Mr. Lincoln.
On May 29, 1865, President Johnson issued Mr. Lincoln's pro-
clamation for North Carolina; and through June 30, 1865, similar
proclamations were issued by President Johnson setting up the local
State Government of all Southern States.
3
The Southern States having been restored to a legal and operational
basis by elections and the convening of State Legislatures, most of
them proceeded to ratify the 13th Amendment which was then pro-
claimed to have been ratified on December 18, 1865. Included in
the 27 States then needed for its adoption were Louisiana, Tennessee,
Arkansas, South Carolina, Alabama, North Carolina, Georgia, Mary-
land, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas.
On April 2, 1866, the President, by proclamation, declared:
It is the manifest determination of the American People that
no State, of its own will, has the right or power to go out of, or
separate itself from or be separated from the American Union,
and that therefore each State ought to remain and constitute an
integral part of the United States. . . . And whereas the Con-
stitution of the United States provides for constituted com-
munities only as States, and not as Territories, dependencies,
provinces or protectorates. And whereas such constituent State-,
must necessarily be, and by the Constitution of the United
States are made equals, and placed upon a like footing as to
political rights, immunities, dignity, and power with the several
States with which they are united. . . . I ..... .do hereby de-
clare that the insurrection which heretofore existed in the States
of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tenn-
essee, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi and rlorida
2. Congressional Globe, p. 78 (1865).
3. 13 STAT. 760, 763, 764, 765, 767, 768, 769, 771 (1865).
[Vol. 11
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at an end, and is henceforth to be regarded.4
On August 20, 1866, a similar proclamation was issued by the
President in respect to Texas.5
Article V of the United States Constitution provides: "No State,
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate." Nevertheless, peace having been restored, the United States
Senate refused to seat the Senators from all of the Southern States.
The House did likewise.
Article V of the Constitution provides the method and manner of
amendment, as follows:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or
on application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the States,
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, in either
case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof,
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by
the Congress. . . . (Writer's emphasis)
The 39th Congress, which proposed the 14th Amendment, met on
December 5, 1865. There were 72 seats in the Senate for 36 States;
22 seats for 11 Southern States were vacant because of a joint resolu-
tion of the House and the Senate which voted not to seat any Senator
or Representative from any Southern States until the Congress de-
cided that each of said States was entitled to such representation.
In the House there were 240 seats, and 58 seats from the 11 Southern
States were vacant. Nebraska was not admitted to the Union as the
37th State until March 1, 1867. One of the new Senators who re-
cently had been elected by the Legislature of his State was Mr. John
P. Stockton of New Jersey.6 John P. Stockton was introduced by
the Senior Senator of New Jersey on December 5, 1866, took the
oath and was duly seated.
While H. J. 127 was still in Mr. Thaddeus Stevens' Committee
on Reconstruction, there was a private polling of Senators and Repre-
sentatives to see how they stood on the measure. Mr. Stockton was
an outspoken opponent of the proposal. Furthermore, since there
were 50 Senators seated, the Constitution would require a 33 1/3
vote, or 34, in order to propose it by a 2/3 vote, and a counting of
4. 14 STAT. 811 (1866).
5. 14 STAT. 814 (1866).
6. This was before the 17th Amendment, which required Senators to be
elected by the people.
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prospective Senate votes showed that there were only 33 who would
vote in favor of it. In a maneuver to reduce the Senate to 49 mem-
bers in order that a vote of 33 yeas would meet the requirements of
the Constitution, a motion was made not to seat Mr. John P. Stock-
ton, in spite of the fact that he had already been seated, on the ground
that his election was invalid because he had been elected by a mere
plurality and not a majority. It was the law of New Jersey and most
of the other States that a plurality determined the election.
The motion not to seat was made because it was impossible to ob-
tain the necessary vote required to expel Mr. Stockton, which was
the only legal means available to prevent a member from voting once
he has been seated. In order to expel a member of the Senate or
House a two-thirds vote was required, and this vote of 2/3 simply
could not be mustered. However, a refusal to seat is determined by
a majority. When this motion was finally called to a vote, after much
debate, it was defeated by a vote of 22 to 21. During the night the
hard core of Reconstructionists persuaded one of the Senators to
change his vote. The next day a motion to reconsider the motion
not to seat Mr. Stockton was sustained by a vote of 22 to 21; thus
he was removed from the Senate and the number reduced to 49.
The 14th Amendment originated in the House of Representatives
by House Joint Resolution 127, introduced by Thaddeus Stevens of
Pennsylvania, and was referred to the Committee on Reconstruction
of which Mr. Stevens was Chairman. Two other bills were offered
and referred to the Committee on Reconstruction and there con-
solidated with H. J. 127 and reported out of the House. It was
passed by the House on May 10, 1866, and sent to the Senate. In
the Senate Mr. Wade proposed an amendment by adding what is
now paragraph 3. As thus amended, it was passed by the Senate on
June 8, 1866, and returned to the House where it was passed on June
13, 1866. In the Senate, the vote was 33 yeas and 11 nays, with 5
not voting. In the House there were 182 Representatives seated
and of those the vote was 120 yeas and 32 nays, with 32 not voting.
If the 22 Senators and 58 Representatives from the Southern
States who had been arbitrarily and unlawfully refused seats by the
Senate and House are counted, the number is 71 Senators and 240
Representatives. The vote in the Senate of 33 for and 11 against by
the members present and voting was 2/3. But if the 2/3 required
had included the 22 arbitrarily and illegally excluded from voting,
there was not a 2/3 vote. Likewise, the vote of 120 for and 32
against in the House was 2/3 of those present and voting. But if
the 58 Representatives who were arbitrarily and illegally excluded
Vol. 11
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had been counted against, the vote would be 120 for and 90 against,
and the vote would have failed to carry by 2/3.
In the foregoing state of the record, the proposed Amendment
was certified to have been passed by a 2/3 vote of each House and
transmitted to the Secretary of State for transmission to the 36 States
then composing the United States. 28 were needed to ratify.7 Ten
States could prevent ratification. The process of ratification began.
By February 1, 1867, 17 States had ratified and 11 had rejected.
Ratified
Connecticut - June 30, 1866
New Hampshire - July 7, 1866
Tennessee - July 7, 1866
New Jersey - September 11, 1866
Oregon - September 19, 1866
Vermont - October 30, 1866
New York - January 10, 1867
Kansas -January 11, 1867
Ohio- January 11, 1867
Illinois - January 15, 1867
West Virginia - January 16,1867
Michigan - January 16, 1867
Minnesota -January 17, 1867
Maine - January 19, 1867
Nevada - January 22, 1867
Indiana - January 23, 1867
Missouri - January 26, 1867
Rejected
Texas - October 27, 1866
Georgia - November 9, 1866
Florida - December 3, 1866
Alabama - December 7, 1866
North Carolina - December 13, 1866
Arkansas -December 17, 1866
South Carolina - December 20, 1866
Virginia - January 9, 1867
Kentucky - January 8, 1867
7. 28 was the figure used by Secretary of State Seward. In the opinion of
this writer, 27 was all that was required as Nebraska was admitted after the
Amendment was proposed.
19591
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Mississippi- January 29, 1867
California - March 17, 18688
The 14th Amendment was thus defeated.
An editorial in the Philadelphia Enquirer on Saturday, February
9, 1867, gave a clue to what was to come. It states:
The Constitutional Amendments having passed both branches
of the Legislature of Pennsylvania will be sent to Governor
Geary, who will undoubtedly sign them next week. Thus an-
other State will be added to the list of those who have ratified
these amendments. As it is probable that nearly all of the States
which sustained the Government during the Rebellion will rati-
fy those amendments, and as all of the Southern States we be-
lieve have now rejected them, the question arises: What will
be done? There is a growing disposition to regard the States
which maintained their relation with the Union as the only ones
which have a voice in this matter, that a resolution will be
brought before the present Congress, or the next, declaring that
the consent of three-fourths of those is all that is necessary to
give force and validity to an amendment to the Constitution is
extremely probable. In that case, we suppose the question will
have to be fought over again in some way, and it is probable
that it will finally enter the Supreme Court, where the decision,
:according to present appearances, will be against it. (Writer's
emphasis).
The Editor was not aware that, four days prior to his editorial, H. R.
1143 had been introduced using a different scheme to accomplish the
desired result.
TH4 RCONSTRUCTION AcT
On February 5, 1867, H. R. 1143 was introduced in the House.
This was a bill whose stated purpose was to provide for the more
efficient Government of the Rebel States.0 This is what historically
was called the "Reconstruction Act". Although these so-called Rebel
States had been functioning as loyal States of the Union in complete
peace for nearly two years, during which time they had ratified the
13th Amendment abolishing slavery, this Act began by declaring:
8. The California Legislature, on March 4, 1866, decided to take no action.
This was equivalent to rejection since it failed to ratify and there were there-
fore in reality 11 rejections. California formally rejected later on March 17,
1868.
9. 14 STAT. 428, 15 STAT. 12, 14, 29 and 30 (1867).
[Vol. 11
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Whereas no legal State Governments or adequate protection for
life or property now exists in the Rebel States of Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama,
Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas ;1o and whereas it is
necessary that peace and good order should be enforced in said
States until loyal and Republican State Governments can be
legally established; ...
Of course, the State Governments were and had been functioning in
peace at all times since the surrender of General Johnston.
The Bill provided for military occupation of the named Southern
States to be conducted without interference from any State authori-
ties. It further provided that the Governments of such States were
only provisional and subject to the paramount authority of the United
States as exercised by the Military Government, and gave authority
to the Military Commanders to try any persons by Military Com-
mission. In addition it provided for new rules of suffrage under
which a new Constitution of each State was to be adopted and a new
Legislature elected, and disfranchised any person who had engaged
in the Rebellion or given aid and comfort to the rebels (which effect-
ually disfranchised all white residents of the States). Nor, under
the Bill was any Senator or Representative to be permitted to take
the oath of office and be admitted to Congress until the new Consti-
tution had met with the approval of Congress, the newly qualified
electorate of the State had elected a Legislature, such Legislature
had adopted the proposed 14th Amendment and the Amendment had
become a part of the Constitution.
It may be here noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held that each of the States has the supreme and exclusive power to
regulate the right of suffrage and to determine the class of inhabitants
who may vote.3.
Congress passed the Bill and President Johnson promptly exercised
his veto power. Congress overrode the veto of the President making
the "Reconstruction Act" the law of the land. By this time three
more States, for a total of 20, had ratified; namely, Rhode Island -
February 7, Pennsylvania - February 12, and Wisconsin - Febru-
ary 13, and Louisiana - February 6, and Delaware - February 7,
1867, had rejected, bringing that total to 13. Thus a Northern State
had now joined 12 Southern States in rejecting when it was only
10. This does not include Tennessee despite the fact that she had been a
member of the Confederacy as she had ratified the 14th Amendment in July
1866.
11. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U. S. 277 (1937).
19591
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necessary to obtain 10 rejections in order to prevent adoption of the
Amendment.'
2
President Johnson's veto message is enlightening and reads, in
part, as follows:
I have examined the bill 'to provide for the more efficient govern-
ment of the Rebel States' with the care and anxiety which its
transcendant importance is calculated to awaken. I am unable
to give it my assent for reasons so grave that I hope a statement
of them may have some influence on the minds of the patriotic
and enlightened men with whom the decision must ultimately
rest.
The bill places all the people of the ten States therein named
under the absolute domination of military rules; and the pre-
amble undertakes to give the reason upon which the measure is
based and the ground upon which it is justified. It declares
that there exists in those States no legal governments and no
adequate protection for life or property, and asserts the neces-
sity of enforcing peace and good order within their limits. This
is not true as a matter of fact.
It is not denied that the States in question have each of them
an actual government, with all the powers - executive, judicial,
and legislative - which properly belong to a free state. They
are organized like the other States of the Union, and, like them,
they make, administer, and execute the laws which concern their
domestic affairs. An existing de facto government, exercising
such functions as these, is itself the law of the state upon all
matters within its jurisdiction. To pronounce the supreme law-
making power of an established state illegal is to say that law
itself is unlawful.
The provisions which these governments have made for the
preservation of order, the suppression of crime, and the redress
of private injuries are in substance and principle the same as
those which prevail in the Northern States and in other civilized
countries. They certainly have not succeeded in preventing the
commission of all crime, nor has this been accomplished any-
where in the world. . . . But that these people are maintaining
12. It is interesting to note that the Louisiana Legislature, which rejected,
was elected under a new Constitution of 1864, which was adopted by a con-
vention held in New Orleans, under the auspices of Federal authorities under
the direction of President Lincoln. The vote of the Louisiana House was
a unanimous 100 to 0.
[Vol. I1I
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local governments for themselves which habitually defeat the
object of all government and render their own lives and property
insecure is in itself utterly improbable, and the averment of the
bill to that effect is not supported by any evidence which has
come to my knowledge ...
The bill, however, would seem to show upon its face that the
establishment of peace and good order is not its real object.
The fifth section declares that the preceding sections shall cease
to operate in any State where certain events shall have happened.
These events are, first, the selection of delegates to a State con-
vention by an election at which Negroes shall be allowed to vote;
second, the formation of a State Constitution by the convention
so chosen; third, the insertion into the State Constitution of a
provision which will secure the right of voting at all elections
to Negroes and to such white men as may not be disfranchised
for rebellion or felony; fourth, the submission of the Constitution
for ratification to Negroes and white men not disfranchised, and
its actual ratification by their vote; fifth, the submission of the
State Constitution to Congress for examination and approval,
and the actual approval of it by that body; sixth, the adoption of
a certain amendment to the Federal Constitution by a vote of the
Legislature elected under the new Constitution; seventh, the
adoption of said amendment by a sufficient number of other States
to make it a part of the Constitution of the United States. All
these conditions must be fulfilled before the people of any of these
States can be relieved from the bondage of military domination;
but when they are fulfilled, then immediately the pains and penal-
ties of the bill are to cease, no matter whether there be peace and
order or not, and without any reference to the security of life
or property. The excuse given for the bill in the preamble-is
admitted by the bill itself not to be real. The military rule which
it establishes is plainly to be used, not for any purpose of order
or for the prevention of crime, but solely as a means of coercing
the people into the adoption of principles and measures to which
it is known that they are opposed, and upon which they have an
undeniable right to exercise their own judgment.
I submit to Congress whether this measure is not in its whole
character, scope, and object without precedent and without au-
thority, in palpable conflict with the plainest provisions of the
Constitution, and utterly destructive to those great principles
of liberty and humanity for which our ancestors on both sides of
1959]
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the Atlantic have shed so much blood, and expended so much
treasure.
The ten States named in the bill are divided into five districts.
For each district an officer of the Army, not below the rank of
a brigadier-general, is to be appointed to rule over the people;
and he is to be supported with an efficient military force to enable
him to perform his duties and enforce his authority. Those
duties and that authority, as defined by the third section of the
bill, are 'to protect all persons in their rights of person and prop-
erty, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to
punish or cause to be punished all disturbers of the public peace
or criminals'. The power thus given to the commanding officer
over all the people of each district is that of an absolute monarch.
His mere will is to take the place of all law ...
It is plain that the authority here given to the military officer
amounts to absolute despotism. But to make it still more un-
endurable, the bill provides that it may be delegated to as many
subordinates as he chooses to appoint, for it declares that he
shall 'punish or cause to be punished'. Such a power has not
been wielded by any Monarch in England for more than five
hundred years. In all that time no people who speak the Jtnglish
language have borne such servitude. It reduces the whole popu-
lation of the ten States - all persons, of every color, sex, and
condition, and every stranger within their limits - to the most
abject and degrading slavery. No master ever had a control
so absolute over the slaves as this bill gives to the military officers
over both white and colored persons ...
I come now to a question which is, if possible, still more import-
ant. Have we the power to establish and carry into execution
a measure like this? I answer, 'Certainly not', if we derive our
authority from the Constitution and if we are bound by the
limitations which it imposes.
This proposition is perfectly clear, that no branch of the rederal
Government - executive, legislative, or judicial - can have
any just powers except those which it derives through and exer-
cises under the organic lawt of the Union. Outside of the
Constitution we have no legal authority more than private cit-
izens, and within it we have only so much as that instrument
gives us. This broad principle limits all our functions and
applies to all subjects. It protects not only the citizens of States
[Vol. I I
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which are within the Union, but it shields every human being
who comes or is brought under our jurisdiction. We have no
right to do in one place more than in another that which the
Constitution says we shall not do at all. If, therefore, the
Southern States were in truth out of the Union, we could not
treat their people in a way which the fundamental law forbids.
Some persons assume that the success of our arms in crushing
the opposition which was made in some of the States to the
execution of the Federal laws reduced those States and all their
people - the innocent as well as the guilty - to the condition
of vassalage and gave us a power over them which the Consti-
tution does not bestow or define or limit. No fallacy can be
more transparent than this. Our victories subjected the insur-
gents to legal obedience, not to the yoke of an arbitrary despot-
ism. When an absolute sovereign reduces his rebellious subjects,
he may deal with them according to his pleasure, because he
had that power before. But when a limited monarch puts down
an insurrection, he must still govern according to law ...
This is a bill passed by Congress in time of peace. There is not in
any one of the States brought under its operation either war or
insurrection. The laws of the States and of the Federal Govern-
ment are all in undisturbed and harmonious operation. The
courts, State and Federal, are open and in the full exercise of
their proper authority. Over every State comprised in these
five military districts, life, liberty, and property are secured by
State laws and Federal laws, and the National Constitution is
every where in force and every where obeyed. What, then, is
the ground on which this bill proceeds? The title of the bill
announces that it is intended 'for the more efficient government'
of these ten States. It is recited by way of preamble that no
legal State Governments 'nor adequate protection for life or
property' exist in those States, and that peace and good order
should be thus enforced. The first thing which arrests attention
upon these recitals, which prepare the way for martial law, is
this, that the only foundation upon which martial law can exist
under our form of Government is not stated or so much as
pretended. Actual war, foreign invasion, domestic insurrection
- none of these appear; and none of these, in fact, exist. It is
not even recited that any sort of war or insurrection is threaten-
ed. Let us pause to consider, upon this question of constitutional
law and the power of Congress, a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in ex parte Milligan.
19591
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I will first quote from the opinion of the majority of the Court:
'Martial law can not arise from a threatened invasion. The
necessity must be actual and present, the invasion real, such as
effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration'.
We see that martial law comes in only when actual war closes
the courts and deposes the civil authority; but this bill, in time
of peace, iihakes martial law operate as though we were in actual
war, and becomes the cause instead of the consequence of the
abrogation of civil authority. One more quotation: 'It follows
from what has been said on this subject that there are occasions
when martial law can be properly applied. If in foreign in-
vasion or civil war the courts are actually closed, and it is im-
possible to administer criminal justice according to law, then,
on the theater of active military operations, where war really
prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil
authority thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army
and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed
to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free
course.
I now quote from the opinion of the minority of the court, de-
livered by Chief Justice Chase: 'We by no means assert that
Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war
has been declared or exists. Where peace exists, the laws of
peace must prevail.'
This is sufficiently explicit. Peace exists in all the territory to
which this bill applies. It asserts a power in Congress, in time
of peace, to set aside the laws of peace and to substitute the
laws of war. The minority, concurring with the majority, de-
clares that Congress does not possess that power. . . . I need
not say to the representatives of the American people that their
Constitution forbids the exercise of judicial power in any way
but one - that is, by the ordained and established courts. It
is equally well known that in all criminal cases a trial by jury is
made indispensable by the express words of that instrument.
... The Constitution also forbids the arrest of the citizen
without judicial warrant, founded on probable cause. This bill
authorizes an arrest without warrant, at the pleasure of a mili-
tary commander. The Constitution declares that 'no person
shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on presentment of a grand jury'. This bill holds every
[Vol. 11
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person not a soldier answerable for all crimes and all charges
without any presentment. The Constitution declares that 'no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law'. This bill sets aside all process of law, and makes
the citizen answerable in his person and property to the will of
one man, and as to his life to the will of two. rinally, the Consti-
tution declares that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or in-
vasion, the public safety may require it'; whereas this bill de-
clares martial law (which of itself suspends this great writ) in
time of peace, and authorizes the military to make the arrest,
and gives to the prisoner only one privilege, and that is a trial
'without unnecessary delay'. He has no hope of release from
custody, except the hope, such as it is, of release by acquittal
before a military commission.
The United States are bound to guarantee to each State a republi-
can form of government. Can it be pretended that this obliga-
tion is not palpably broken if we carry out a measure like this,
which wipes away every vestage of republican government in
ten States and puts the life, property, liberty, and honor of all
people in each of them under the domination of a single person
clothed with unlimited authority?
.... , here is a bill of attainder against 9,000,000 people at
once. It is based upon an accusation so vague as to be scarcely
intelligible and found to be true upon no credible evidence. Not
one of the 9,000,000 was heard in his own defense. The repre-
sentatives of the doomed parties were excluded from all partici-
pation in the trial. The conviction is to be followed by the most
ignominious punishment ever inflicted on large masses of men.
It disfranchises them by hundreds of thousafids and degrades
them all, even those who are admitted to be guiltless, from the
rank of freemen to the condition of slaves.
The purpose and object of the bill - the general intent which
pervades it from beginning to end - is to change the entire
structure and character of the State Governments and to compel
them by force to the adoption of organic laws and regulations
which they are unwilling to accept if left to themselves. The
Negroes have not asked for the privilege of voting; the vast
majority of them have no idea what it means. This bill not only
thrusts it into their hands, but compels them, as well as the
whites, to use it in a particular way. If they do not form a
19591
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Constitution with prescribed articles in it and afterwards elect
a legislature which will act upon certain measures in a prescribed
way, neither blacks nor whites can be relieved from the slavery
which the bill imposes upon them. Without pausing here to
consider the policy or impolicy of Africanizing the southern part
of our territory, I would simply ask the attention of Congress to
that manifest, well-known, and universally acknowledged rule
of Constitutional law which declares that the Federal Govern-
ment has no jurisdiction, authority, or power to regulate such
subjects for any State. To force the right of suffrage out of the
hands of the white people and into the hands of the Negroes is
an arbitrary violation of this principle ...
That the measure proposed by this bill does violate the Constitu-
tion in the particulars mentioned and in many other ways which
I forbear to enumerate is too clear to admit the least doubt. It
only remains to consider whether the injunctions of that instru-
ment ought to be obeyed or not. I think they ought to be obeyed,
for reasons which I will proceed to give as briefly as possible.
In the first place, it is the only system of free Government which
we can hope to have as a Nation. When it ceases to be the rule
of our conduct, we may perhaps take our choice between complete
anarchy, a consolidated despotism, and a total dissolution of the
Union; but national liberty regulated by law will have passed
beyond our reach ...
It was to punish the gross crime of defying the Constitution and
to vindicate its supreme authority that we carried on a bloody
war of four years' duration. Shall we now acknowledge that
we sacrificed a million of lives and expended billions of treasure
to enforce a Constitution which is not worthy of respect and
preservation?. ...
It is a part of our public history which can never be forgotten
that both Houses of Congress, in July 1861, declared in the form
of a solemn resolution that the war was and should be carried
on for no purpose of subjugation, but solely to enforce the Consti-
tution and laws, and that when this was yielded by the parties
in rebellion the contest should cease, with the Constitutional
rights of the States and of individuals unimpaired. This resolu-
tion was adopted and sent forth to the world unanimously by
the Senate and with only two dissenting voices in the House. It
was accepted by the friends of the Union in the South as well
as in the North as expressing honestly and truly the object of
[Vol. 11
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the War. On the faith of it many thousands of persons in both
sections gave their lives and their fortunes to the cause. To
repudiate it now by refusing to the States and to the individuals
within them the 'rights' which the Constitution and laws of the
Union would secure to them is a breach of our plighted honor
for which I can imagine no excuse and to which I cannot volun-
tarily become a party. ....
* . I am thorougly convinced that any settlement or com-
promise or plan of action which is inconsistent with the principles
of the Constitution will not only be unavailing, but mischievous;
that it will but multiply the present evils, instead of removing
them. The Constitution, in its whole integrity and vigor,
throughout the length and breadth of the land, is the best of all
compromises. Besides, our duty does not, in my judgment, leave
us a choice between that and any other. I believe that it con-
tains the remedy that is so much needed, and that if the coordinate
branches of the Government would unite upon its provisions
they would be found broad enough and strong enough to sustain
in time of peace the Nation which they bore safely through the
ordeal of a protracted civil war. Among the most sacred guar-
anties of that instrument are those which declare that 'each
State shall have at least one Representative', and that 'no State,
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in
the Senate'. Each House is made the 'judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its own members,' and may, 'with
the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member'. Thus, as here-
tofore urged, 'in the admission of Senators and Representatives
from any and all of the States there can be no just ground of
apprehension that persons who are disloyal will be clothed with
the powers of legislation, for this could not happen when the
Constitution and the laws are enforced by a vigilant and faithful
Congress'. When a Senator or Representative presents his
certificate of election, he may at once be admitted or rejected;
or, should there be any question as to his eligibility, his cre-
dentials may be referred for investigation to the appropriate
committee. If admitted to a seat, it must be upon evidence
satisfactory to the House of which he thus becomes a member
that he possesses the requisite constitutional and legal qualifica-
tions. If refused admission as a member for want of due alle-
giance to the Government, and returned to his constituents, they
are admonished that none but persons loyal to the United States
19591
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will be allowed a voice in the legislative councils of the Nation,
and the political power and moral influence of Congress are thus
effectively exerted in the interests of loyalty to the Government
and fidelity to the Union ....
While we are legislating upon subjects which are of great import-
ance to the whole people, and which must affect all parts of the
country, not only during the life of the present generation, but
for ages to come, we should remember that all men are entitled
at least to a hearing in the councils which decide upon the destiny
of themselves and their children. At present ten States are
denied representation, and when the Fortieth Congress assembles
on the 4th day of the present month sixteen States will be with-
out a voice in the House of Representatives. This grave fact,
with the important questions before us, should induce us to
pause in a course of legislation which, looking solely to the attain-
ment of political ends, fails to consider the rights it transgresses,
the law which it violates, or the institutions which it imperils.
ANDREW JOHNSON
In Volume II, p. 42 of the Growth of the American Republic,
Samuel Eliot Morison, Professor of American History at Harvard
University, and Henry Steel Commanger, Professor of History,
Columbia University, speaking of the Reconstruction Act stated:
Johnson returned the bill with a scorching message arguing the
unconstitutionality of the whole thing, and the most impartial
students have agreed with his reasoning, Professor Burgess writ-
ing, indeed, that there was hardly a line in the entire bill which
would stand the test of the Constitution.
On the same day of the veto, March 2, 1867, the House and the
Senate overrode it by a 2/3 vote and the Bill became Public Law 68.
Although considering the Act to be unconstitutional, as expressed in
his veto message, President Johnson considered it his duty to enforce
the law and proceeded to execute it. He thereupon sent the Army
into the South; ousted all State Legislatures and Governments by
military force; disfranchised all those who had participated in the
Rebellion or who had aided or abetted them (contrary to the consti-
tutional law announced by the U. S. Supreme Court); held elections
in which all of the Negroes but practically no whites were eligible
to vote. New constitutions were adopted and new legislatures were
convened and the latter proceeded to ratify the 14th Amendment.
The Army, all the while, was in control.
[Vol. 11
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When the supplemental Reconstruction Act was passed in March
of 1867, and then passed over the veto of the President on March
23, 1867, the Baltimore Sun carried the following Editorial on March
25,1867:
The Last Veto. The message of President Johnson, returning
to Congress on Saturday last, the bill supplementary to the Act
to provide for more efficient government of the Rebel State,
assigning his reasons for non-approval, one of the most plain
and convincing in argument among the several able State papers
he has been called upon to indite in his endeavors to stay the
Vandal hand of the Congressional majority, and conserve the
great fundamental principles of the Constitution and Govern-
ment.
While the military occupation of the South was in progress, Massa-
chusetts and Nebraska ratified, on March 20 and June 15, 1867,
respectively. On March 23, by Joint Resolution, the State of Mary-
land rejected, becoming the 14th State to reject.
Observing how Congress had taken the Constitution into its own
hands and was proceeding in willful disregard of the Constitution,
on the 15th of January, 1868 - Ohio, and then on March 24, 1868 -
New Jersey,13 voted to withdraw their prior ratifications and to re-
13. The following is an excerpt from Joint Resolution No. 1 of the State
of New Jersey of March 24, 1868, when they rescinded their prior ratification
and rejected:
It being necessary, by the Constitution, that every amendment to the
same should be proposed by two thirds of both Houses of Congress,
the authors of said proposition, for the purpose of securing the assent
of the requisite majority, determined to, and did, exclude from the
said two Houses eighty representatives from eleven States of the
Union, upon the pretense that there were no such States in the Union;
but, finding that two-thirds of the remainder of said Houses could not
be brought to assent to the said proposition, they deliberately formed
and carried out the design of mutilating the integrity of the United
States Senate, and without any pretext or justification, other than
the possessioh of the power, without the right, and in palpable vio-
lation of the Constitution, ejected a member of their own body, rep-
resenting this State, and thus practically denied to New Jersey its
equal suffrage in the Senate and thereby nominally secured the vote
of two-thirds of the said Houses.
The object of dismembering the highest representative assembly in
the Nation, and humiliating a State of the Union, faithful at all times
to all of its obligations, and the object of said amendment were one
- to place new and unheard-of powers in the hands of a faction, that
it might absorb to itself all executive, judicial and legislative power,
necessary to secure to itself immunity for the unconstitutional acts it
had already committed, and those it has since inflicted on a too patient
people.
The subsequent usurpation of these once national assemblies, in pass-
ing pretended laws for the establishment, in ten States, of martial
law, which is nothing but the will of the military commander, and
therefore, inconsistent with the very nature of all law, for the purpose
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ject. Thus 16 States had now rejected prior to a full ratification
by a 3/4 vote having been reached. Iowa ratified on March 9, 1868.
Prior to the Proclamation of the Secretary of State, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Massachusetts, for a total of 23 States
had ratified, but this number was reduced to 21 by the withdrawals
of Ohio and New Jersey. The rejections, counting the withdrawals,
numbered 16. On October 15, 1868, Oregon withdrew its ratification
and became the 17th of 37 States to reject. The count stood: 20
of reducing to slavery men of their own race in those States, or com-
pelling them, contrary to their own convictions, to exercise the elective
franchise in obedience to the dictation of a faction in those assemblies;
the attempt to commit to one man arbitrary and uncontrolled power,
which they have found necessary to exercise to force the people of
those States into compliance with their will; the authority given to
the Secretary of War to use the name of the President, to countermand
its Presidnt's orders, and to certify military orders to be 'by the
direction of the President' when they are notoriously known to be
contrary to the President's direction, thus keeping up the forms of
the Constitution to which the people are accustomed, but practically
deposing the President from his office of Commander-in-Chief, and
suppressing one of the great departments of the Government, that
of the executive; the attempt to withdraw from the supreme judicial
tribunal of the Nation the jurisdiction to examine and decide upon
the conformity of their pretended laws to the Constitution, which was
the chief function of that august tribunal, as organized by the fathers
of the republic; all are but amplified explanations of the power they
hope to acquire by the adoption of the said amendment.
To conceal from the people the immense alteration of the fundamental
law they intended to accomplish by the said amendment, they gilded
the same with propositions of justice ....
It imposes new prohibitions upon the power of the State to pass laws,
and interdicts the execution of such part of the common law as the
national judiciary may esteem inconsistent with the vague provisions
of the said amendment; made vaoue for the purpose of facilitating
encroachment upon the lives, liberties and property of the people.
It enlarges the judicial power of the United States so as to bring
every law passed by the State, and every principle of the common law
relating to life, liberty, or property, within the jurisdiction of the
Federal tribunals, and charges those tribunals with duties, to the due
performance of which they, from their nature and organization, and
their distance from the prople, are unequal.
It makes a new apportionment of representatives in the National
courts, for no other reason than thereby to secure to a faction a
sufficient number of votes of a servile and ignorant race to outweight
the intelligent voices of their own.
This Legislature, feeling conscious of the support of the largest
majority of the people that has ever been given expression to the
public will, declare that the said proposed amendment being designed
to confer, or to compel the States to confer, the sovereign right of
elective franchise upon a race which has never given the slightest
evidence, at any time, or in any quarter of the globe, of its capacity for
self-government, and erect an impracticable standard of suffrage,
which will render the right valueless to any portion of the people,
was intended to overthrow the system of self-government under which
the people of the United States have for eighty years enjoyed their
liberties, and is unfit, from its origin, its object and its matter, to be
incorporated with the fundamental law of a free people: . ...
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ratifications and 17 rejections, (hardly near the 3/4 majority required
for adoption). Even without considering the rejection of Oregon,
which came after the date of the Proclamation of the Secretary of
State, (July 20, 1868), the 14th Amendment had by legal means
been overwhelmingly rejected.' 4
After the U. S. Army had moved into the South and taken charge
by force of arms and ousted the duly elected and qualified Legisla-
tures of all of the Southern States (except Tennessee), disqualified
practically all of the white voters (by Act of Congress and not by
State law), enfranchised all of the Negroes, elected Negro Legisla-
tures, and adopted new constitutions by these purported Legislatures,
the matter of ratification of the 14th Amendment as a condition to
permission by Congress for the exercise of suffrage of the Southern
States (violating Article V of the U. S. Constitution) was presented
to these newly constituted Negro Legislatures of such States. The
rejections by the legally elected and constituted Legislatures of all
of the Southern States were ignored and the newly constituted Legis-
latures of Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Louisiana, South
Carolina, Alabama and Georgia, ratified on April 16, June 9, July
2, July 9, and July 16, 1868, and July 21, 1868, respectively.
At this point, by counting the ratifications of Ohio and New Jersey,
who had in the meanwhile withdrawn their ratifications and had re-
jected, and by not counting the rejections of Arkansas, Florida,
North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina and Alabama, who had
later, by way of illegally established Legislatures, ratified under
compulsion of the military force of the U. S. Army, the total of 28
States needed to ratify was achieved.
The Secretary of State then proceeded to publish an equivocal
proclamation. Therein he stated that whereas under an Act of
Congress it. had been made the duty of the Secretary of State to
cause any amendment to the Constitution which had been adopted
according to the prozisions of said Constitution to be published with
his certificate specifying the States by which the same had been
adopted, and that the same had become a part of the Constitution
14. Oregon had ratified on September 19, 1866. The vote in the House was
25 yeas and 22 nays. Thomas H. Bentz and M. A. McKean of Grant County
both voted yea. Their election had recently been certified by the County Clerk
of. Grant County and based thereon they had been seated. But, on a contest,
it was found that they had in fact been defeated and that the certification by
the County Clerk was false and fraudulent. They were unseated, and J. M.
McCoy and G. W. Knisley, who had been duly elected, were seated. The
latter immediately informed the House that if they had been seated and allowed
to vote they would have voted nay. The vote would therefore have been 23
yeas and 24 nays. Consequently, the old ballot was declared invalid and on
October 15, 1868, a new vote was taken, resulting in a vote for rejection.
Nevertheless, Oregon is counted as one of the States which ratified.
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of the United States and, whereas neither the Act referred to, nor
any other law authorized the Secretary of State to determine and
decide questions as to the authenticity of the organization of State
Legislatures, or as to the power of any State Legislature to recall
a previous Act or resolution or ratification, or, rejections of any
amendment, that if the ratification of the States of Ohio and New
Jersey were counted as having ratified, notwithstanding their subse-
quent rejection; and if the ratifications of the "newly" constituted
and newly established bodies avowing themselves to be and actitg as
the Legislatures, respectively, of Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina,
Louisiana, South Carolina and Alabama, were counted, the 14th
Amendment was ratified. This Proclamation was made on July 20,
1868.15 Although the question as to whether an amendment of the
U. S. Constitution has been properly submitted by Congress and
properly ratified by the State in accord with the Federal Constitution,
is properly a legal question to be determined by the U. S. Supreme
CourtJ6 and Congress has no more right to decide this than the
Secretary of State, the Senate and the House one day later, on July
21, 1868, by majority voice vote, proceeded by separate resolutions
to "resolve" that the 14th Amendment had been adopted and was a
part of the Constitution. Then, pursuant to this Resolution, the
Secretary of State issued a new proclamation on July 27, 1868, re-
citing resolutions of the House and the Senate which declared the
14th Amendment adopted, and he thereby proclaimed it had been
adopted.17
ATrmpTs To OBTAIN A DEcIsIoN OF THE SUPPEME COURT
Although repeated efforts have been made to get the United States
Supreme Court to directly pass on the question as to whether the
14th Amendment was adopted, the issue has invariably been dodged
and no opinion has ever considered or discussed it. There have been
several hundred cases in which the Supreme Court has based its
holding on the 14th Amendment, but all of these have been based
upon prima facie presumption of validity resulting from the Procla-
mation of the Secretary of State.
In ex parte Milligan,'8 decided by the Supreme Court on December
17, 1866, the Court held that the trial and conviction of a civilian by
a military commission where peace exists and the civil courts were
open was null and void as the commission had no jurisdiction, and
15. 15 STAT. 706 (1868).
16. Opinion of Justices, 204 N. C. 806, 172 S. E. 474 (1933).
17. 15STAT. 708 (1868).
18. 4 Wall. 2 (1866).
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further that Congress had no authority to apply the laws of War
when no War existed. Despite this ruling, William McCardle was
arrested and held for trial in Mississippi by a military commission
when no War existed and the civil courts were open. This case
clearly demonstrated that the Congress of the United States was
aware of the unconstitutionality of the Reconstruction Act and was
unwilling to permit a decision of the Supreme Court to prevent the
carrying out of their known illegal plan. The Members of Congress
had read the veto message of President Johnson and recognized its.
validity and were well aware of what the result would be if the Court
was forced to pass on the question.
William McCardle was the Editor of the Vicksburg Times. He
was arrested by the military authorities in Mississippi for publishing
an editorial regarding the validity of the Reconstruction Act, and
they proposed to try him before the military commission for impeding
reconstruction, inciting disorder and disturbance of the peace. On
November 12, 1867, he applied to the United States Circuit Court
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Reconstruction
Act was unconstitutional and void and that the military commis-
sion was without legal authority to try him. The writ was issued
directing the military commission to produce the body of McCardle
and to present the cause of his imprisonment. The military authori-
ties delivered McCardle into the custody of the U. S. Marshal show-
ing they were holding him under authority of the Reconstruction
Act.
Robert A. Hill of Jacinto, Mississippi, had been appointed Judge
of said Court on May 1, 1866. He was a native of North Carolina,
age 54, and an Old Line Whig. He had had experience as a State
Court Judge in Tennessee and Northern Mississippi. Both the Judge
and McCardle recognized that this case was a means of obtaining
from the Supreme. Court a ruling on the constitutionality of the
Reconstruction Act on appeal. A hearing was held and on November
25, 1867, the Court adjudged that McCardle be remanded into the
custody of the military authorities from which judgment McCardle
appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed
his release on bond.
In the Supreme Court a motion to dismiss was filed by the Govern-
ment on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case, based upon the Act of February 1867 relating to suits begun in
State Courts involving habeas corpus.' 9 On February 17, 1868 the
19. 14 STAT. 385 (1867).
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Court decided that it had jurisdiction and denied the motion to
dismiss.2 0
Word was passed to the leaders of Congress that the Court would
be forced to declare the Reconstruction Act to be unconstitutional.
While the case was thus pending Congress acted quickly. A bill
was presented to the House to deprive the Supreme Court of juris-
diction to decide the case. Mr. Schenck, Chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee, in reporting the bill to the House with recom-
mendation that it be passed, stated that the bill was designed to pre-
vent the Supreme Court from passing on the validity of reconstruction
legislation.2 '
Congress quickly passed this bill, which was vetoed by the Presi-
dent, and on March 27, 1868,22 it was enacted over his veto. This
statute deprived the Supreme Court of any jurisdiction to decide that
type of case. The case was not argued until March 19, 1869, and, on
April 12, 1869, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of
jurisdition.2 3 The Legislature of the United States had thus de-
liberately and intentionally prevented the Supreme Court of the
United States from declaring the Reconstruction Act unconstitu-
tional. If it had done so, the whole military occupation of the South-
ern States would probably have forthwith terminated and the Legis-
lature of the United States would have been thwarted in its effort to
force the adoption of the 14th Amendment by such illegal and un-
constitutional means.
In Marbury v. Madison,21 decided February 24, 1803, the Supreme
Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall had held that an Act
of Congress which was repugnant to the Constitution was invalid
and that it was within the judicial powers of the courts to so decide.
The contention was made that the Act of Congress was a political
Act and could not be inquired into by the courts. Chief Justice
Marshall said: "This doctrine would subvert the very foundation
of all written constitutions." And: "It would be giving to the legisla-
ture a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which
professes to restrict its powers within narrow limits." Again, in
Luther v. Bordel,2 5 in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, the Court
had said:
The high power has been conferred on this court, of passing
20. Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318 (1868).
21. 81 Congressional Globe 1881, 1883.
22. 15 STAT. 44 (1868).
23. E= parte McCardie, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).
24. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
25. 7 How. 1 (1848).
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judgment upon the acts of the state sovereignties and the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the federal government, and of
determining whether they are beyond the limits of power marked
out for them respectively by the Constitution of the United
States.
In March 1867, the State of Mississippi filed a motion for leave
of court to file a bill in the name of the State to enjoin President
Johnson from executing the Reconstruction Act on the ground it
was unconstitutional. It was argued on April 12 and on April 15,2 6
the Court held it had no jurisdiction to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties, as the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Departments of the Government were equal, the President
being the Executive.
Later, in Georgia v. Stanton,2 7 argued in April and May of 1867,
decided May 13, 1867, but opinion withheld until February 10, 1868,
the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Act was directly attacked
and an injunction sought in the U. S. Supreme Court to enjoin Secre-
tary of War Stanton and General Grant and others from carrying
out the military occupation of Georgia, inasmuch as the execution
of this law would totally abolish the existing government of the
State of Georgia. The Supreme Court has held on many occasions
that the acts of an individual officer of the Government, which are
void because of unconstitutionality, even though acting under an
Act of Congress, are merely acts as an individual and may be en-
joined by the Courts. Despite these holdings and the holdings of
Marbury v. Madison and Luther v. Borden, which held the Court
had the power and duty to determine whether an Act of Congress
violated the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court
dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that only a political question was presented. The case of Mississippi
v. Stanton was decided at the same time with the identical opinion.
In Volume II of the GROWTH or TnH AtRICAN RtPUB.IC, it
was said, at page 51 :
Many of the Acts which Congress passed to carry into effect
its reconstruction policy were palpably unconstitutional, but the
attitude of the Radicals was well expressed by General Grant
when he said of this legislation that 'much of it, no doubt, was
unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would
serve their purpose before the question of unconstitutionality
could be submitted to the judiciary and a decisiop obtained.'
26. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (1867).
27. 6 Wall. 50 (1867).
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The 14th Amendment contains many desirable provisions as may
be observed. It provides:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-
one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or is any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the pro-
portion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative
in Congress, or elector of President or Vice-President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member
of any State Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same
or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such dis-
ability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the Unite4
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment
of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection
or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United
States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
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incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and
void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
There are also many excellent and highly desirable provisions in
the first Ten Amendments, commonly called the "Bill of Rights" and
in the amendments adopted before and after the 14th. But, the
desirability of an amendment to the Constitution cannot accomplish
the adoption thereof, nor can the passage of time override the specific
provisions of Article V which details the only method by which the
Constitution can be changed. The Congress has expended its func-
tion in the amending process when it has proposed the amendment
to the States. Any further action is completely outside the scope of
the amending process.2 8
On July 12, 1909, when Senate Joint Resolution No. 40 proposing
the 16th Amendment was under consideration, the Honorable Cordel
Hull 29 in a speech in Congress, referred to the unconstitutionality
of the purported adoption of the 14th Amendment.30 He stated:
While the sole function of Congress with respect to amendments
is to propose to the States such amendments as two-thirds of
both Houses see fit, to be ratified or rejected, either of the State
Legislature or by conventions, yet Congress in this instance did
not permit all of the States to act upon this proposed amendment
... . It must be conceded that the moment three-fourths of
the States duly ratify an amendment it becomes a part of the
Constitution, the proclamation of the Secretary of State being
a mere ministerial act. Hence, it follows that Congress has not
power in the premises after it has once proposed an amendment
to the States as the Constitution provides, not even of recalling
the amendment; therefore, the passage of any resolution by
Congress declaring that a given amendment has or has not been
duly ratified by the States, such as was done with respect to the
14th Amendment, is ultra vires and void.
Many legal questions arise in respect to the existence or not of
the 14th Amendment. Some of these will be discussed hereafter.
28. 2 CuRTIS' HIsToRY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 380; Chandler v.
Wise, 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. 2d 1024 (1937).
29. Later Secretary of State.
30. 44(4) Cong. Rec. 4404 (1909).
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1. Were the Southern States ever out of the Union?
This question is answered in the negative by the United States
Supreme Court in Texas v. White,3' which was an original case
brought by Texas, filed on February 15, 1867, decided April 12,
1869. It was contended that the State by reason of its act of secession
had so changed its status as not to be a State entitled to file suit
against the United States in the Supreme Court. In holding that
Texas was and always had been a State in the Union from the date
of its admission, the Court, after discussing its acts of secession, etc.,
said:
Did Texas in consequence of these acts cease to be a State? Or
if not, did the State cease to be a member of the Union?
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and
arbitrary relation. . . . It was confirmed and strengthened by
the necessities of War and received definite form and character
and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the
Union was solemnly declared to 'be perpetual'. And when these
articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the
country, the Constitution was ordained 'to form a more perfect
union'. It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity
more dearly than by these words ...
When therefore Texas became one of the United States she en-
tered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of per-
petual union, and all the guaranties of republican government
in the Union, attached at once to the State. The Act which
consummated her admission into the Union was something more
than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into
the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas
and the other States was as complete and perpetual, and as indis-
soluble as the union between the original States. There was
no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through re-
volution or through consent of the State. Considered, there-
fore, as transactions under the Constitution, the Ordinance of
Secession adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority
of the citizens of Texas, and all of the Acts of her Legislature
intended to give effect to that ordinance, were null and void.
They were utterly without operation of law. The obligations of
the State as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the
State as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and
31. 7 Wall. 700 (1869).
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unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to
be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union.3 2
2. Were the duly elected and organized bodies, acting as the
Legislatures in the eleven Southern States, prior to March 2, 1867,
duly organized under the Constitution of the United States?
For nearly two years prior to March 2, 1867, the Civil War had
ended and peace had been restored. By Proclamation of President
Johnson of April 2, 1866, the War had been declared ended. Under
the Constitution which required that all States be equal, the rebellious
Stateg were restored to an equal basis and placed on a like footing as
to political rights, immunities, dignities and power as the remainder
of the Union. During the year of 1865, following the surrender of
General Lee at Appomattox on April 9, and General Johnston at
Durham Station on April 26, Legislatures of the Southern States
had organized pursuant to President Johnson's Proclamation. These
Legislatures had ratified the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery,
which was proclaimed adopted by the Secretary of State on December
18, 1865. This ratification was recognized by all Departments of
the Government: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. Of legal
necessity they recognized the then existing legislative bodies of at
least the Southern States who had ratified, namely: Tennessee,
Arkansas, South Carolina, Alabama, North Carolina and Georgia.3 3
The Legislatures of the Southern States were duly organized and
existing, and since Congress lacked authority to oust these Legisla-
tures by military power or otherwise, they never legally ceased to
exist. The new Legislatures installed by the Army were, therefore,
null and void and all new State officers were likewise usurpers,
totally lacking in State authority.
3. Were the two Houses of the 39th Congress organized accord-
ing to the Constitution? If not, what effect did the failure to seat
Senators from the Southern States have upon the proceeding?
Section 5 of Article I of the Constitution provides that: "Each
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
of its own members,..."
While each House is made the sole Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its members, there is no authority granted by
the Constitution to refuse to "Judge." The whole purpose of this
32. See also Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197 (1870); White v. Hart, 13
Wall. 646 (18....) ; and Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570 (1873), the latter hold-
ing that the Acts of the individual States of the South during the Civil War,
so far as they did not impair or intend to impair the supremacy of the national
authority are to be treated as valid and binding.
33. The case of Horn v. Lockhart, note 32 supra, is decisive of this question.
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constitutional provision relates to the judging of each individual
member. It contemplates a hearing and the taking of evidence with
a right to be heard before being judged. To arbitrarily decide not
to seat any of the Senators or Representatives from any specified
States without even a hearing was not a judging, but rather an
arbitrary deprivation of the equal suffrage of these States in violation
of Article V of the Constitution. Upon a hearing and judging the
Houses might lawfully have refused to seat all or most of such duly
elected persons, or they might have decided to seat any portion of
them. But an arbitrary refusal to judge as authorized by the Consti-
tution was an arbitrary refusal to seat in violation of the Constitution,
and was therefore unlawful. 3
4
4. Is the election of the Members of a State Legislature, con-
ducted under military force by the United States Army, in violation
of the laws of suffrage of such State, a valid election?
In the case of Breedlove v. Suttle,3 5 the United States Supreme
Court 'has held that each of the States has the supreme and exclusive
power to -regulate the right of suffrage and to determine the class
of inhabitants who may vote. The use of the U. S. Army in 1867
to occupy several of the sovereign States, change the State rules of
suffrage, and to purportcdly elect new State officers and new State
Legislatures was just as patently illegal as it would be today. If the
officers of the Federal Government could in 1867 send the Army
into a State, oust its legislators and officers, and elect new ones
under their own rules of suffrage, then a political party today could,
after coming to power, use the United States Army to seize and
occupy all States having a predominantly different party, oust its
officers and legislators and make its return to self-government con-
ditional on its ratification of an amendment to the Constitution
abolishing all other political parties.36 In other words, if the action
of the Congress in the Reconstruction Act and all done under it be
34. If the Southern representatives had been seated and, as is likely, had
voted unanimously against the Amendment, the vote would have been 33 yeas and
29 nays in the Senate, and 128 yeas and 79 nays in the House and the Amend-
ment would have failed in both Houses.
35. 302 U. S. 277 (1937).
36. The ratification procured by an unlawful refusal to seat the duly elected
representatives of the State and of the people of the State is similar to duress,
This was coercion. Coercion exists where one, by the unlawful conduct of
another, is induced to do or perform some act under circumstances which
deprive him of the exercise of his free will. Coercion exists when the person
is thus constrained to do what his free will would refuse. 14 C. J. S. 1307.
A ratification procured by coercion against the free will of the Legislature,
and -which if it were not for the coercion would be rejected, is obviously not a
binding and valid ratification within the meaning of the Sth Amendment of the
Constitution.
[Vol. 11
29
McElwee: The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and t
Published by Scholar Commons, 1959
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
valid, then the United States can at any time by a simple majority
vote of the Congress establish an absolute dictatorship.
Mr. Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, on December 14, 1865,
said:
According to my judgment they (Southern States) ought never
to be recognized as capable of being counted as valid States
until the Constitution has been so amended as to secure as-
cendency of the Party of the Union (Republican).
His plan was twofold: first, to reduce the representation to which
the Southern States were entitled under the Constitution; second,
to enfranchise the blacks and disenfranchise the whites. This was
calculated to keep the Southern States out of the Union until the
Constitution had been so amended as to accomplish his objects and
after that have control of the Southern States in the hands of the
Party of the Union (Republican).7
If Mr. Thaddeus Stevens 3S could legally accomplish his objects in
1867, and 1868, some political leader fired with personal ambition
could make himself dictator and override and destroy the Constitu-
tion in 1968 with the support of a majority in Congress and the
Army to back him. The pattern is already established and he need
but follow precedent.
5. Is the ratification of a constitutional amendment by a Legisla-
ture elected, as in Question No. 4, valid and effective?
The votes of the Southern Legislatures which were counted as
having ratified the 14th Amendment by the Secretary of State when
he issued his proclamation were not the votes of the duly constituted
and existing Legislatures of such States, and the certification of rati-
fication by a usurper claiming to be Governor of a State was no
certification at all. The Acts of Congress asserting that it had been
ratified did not add one inch to its size. The Proclamation of the
Secretary of State added no more to the compliance with the require-
ments of Article V of the Constitution than if there had been not a
single ratification. By these methods, the Speaker of the House, the
President of the Senate, and the Secretary of State, without even a
37. 2 CuRTis CoNsTITuTioN HIsTORy.
38. 2 GROWTH op Tm A RicAN REPUBLIc 38, is stated:
Stevens is one of the most unpleasant characters in American History.
A harsh, sombre, friendless old man of seventy-four, and with no
redeeming spark of magnanimity, he was moved less by sympathy for
the Negro than by cold hatred of the Southern gentry. The former
he would exalt to a status of complete political and social equality;
the latter he would humiliate, disenfranchise, and despoil of all landed
property in favor of the freedman.
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vote of the Senate or House, or a ratification by a single State, could
amend the Constitution at will.
6. May a State change its position toward an amendment before
there has been a ratification by 3/4 of the States?
Many experts on constitutional law have taken the position and
expressed the view that such a change can be made. The Supreme
Court of Kentucky, in the case of Wise v. Chandler,39 has held that
when a State has acted on a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution, to either ratify or reject, its power further to consider
the question has been exhausted without a resubmission by the
Congress. Certiorari was granted in this case to the United States
Supreme Court,4 0 but the case was dismissed on the ground that
there was no controversy susceptible of judicial determination. The
United States Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller,41 held that the
Supreme Court of Kansas had a right to consider the question as
to whether the proposed Child Labor Amendment to the United
States Constitution had been properly ratified under a claim of mem-
bers of the State Senate that their votes had not been given effect.
But the specific question here considered has never been passed upon
directly by the United States Supreme Court.
7. Is the question of the validity of the 14th Amendment a legal
or a political one?
Applying the test as announced by the Supreme Court in Marbury
v. Madison,42 the question as to whether a constitutional amendment
has been effectuated is properly a judicial rather than a political one.
However, that the question is a political one seems to be so well
established as not to afford a contrary view.
Early in April, 1867, Georgia and Mississippi filed bills for leave
of the Court to enjoin the Secretary of War Stanton and General
Grant from carrying out the Reconstruction Act.
In Georgia v. Stanton43 and Mississippi v. Stanton'4 the consti-
tutionality of the Reconstruction Act was directly attacked and the
Supreme Court dismissed the complaints for alleged lack of jurisdic.
tion on the ground that only a political question was presented.
In Coleman v. Miller,45 the Court discussed the questionable nature
of the adoption of the 14th Amendment pointing out the incongruity
39. 270 Ky. 1, 108 S. W. 2d 1024 (1937).
40. Chandler v. Wise, 307 U. S. 474 (1938).
41. 307 U. S. 433 (1938).
42. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
43. 6 Wall. 50 (1867).
44. 6 Wall. 50 (1867).
45. 307 U. S. 433 (1938).
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of the failure to recognize the withdrawals of the ratifications by,
Ohio and New Jersey as compared to the subsequent ratifications of'
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, after such States
had formally rejected. The Court referred to the dubious first
Proclamation of the Secretary of State and the following Act of
Congress which declared the 14th Amendment to have been adopted
and the second Proclamation of the Secretary of State proclaiming
adoption. The Court then stated:
This decision by the political departments of the Government
as to the validity of the adoption of the 14th Amendment has
been accepted. We think that in accordance with this historic
precedent the question of the efficacy of ratifications of State
Legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted
withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining
to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in Con-
gress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the
adoption of the Amendment.
In Leser v. Garnett,4 6 it was held that the certificate of the Secre-
tary of State certifying to the ratification of the 19th Amendment
was binding on the courts. The duty to act in regard to Constitutional
Amendments has now been given to the Administrator, General
Services Administration. 4 7
That the rulings in Leser v. Garnett; Coleman v. Miller, and
Chandler v. Wise are of doubtful wisdom is emphasized by the
actions of the Legislatures of Oregon and New Jersey. At the time
of the Proclamation of Secretary Seward, the Legislature of Oregon
had ratified and such ratification had been duly attested to by the Gov-
ernor. But, upon investigation it was found that such vote was based
upon fraud and that two of the members of the Legislature, whose
votes were essential to ratification, had not in fact been elected.
Their seating had been procured by a fraudulent certification of
election by a county clerk. After the facts were discovered, these
two members were unseated and the duly elected ones were seated.
Upon a demand by them, a new vote was taken in which their legal
votes were counted. The Amendment was rejected. Nevertheless,
Oregon was counted as having ratified the 14th Amendment.
46. 258 U. S. 130 (1921). In spite of the fact that the persons who made the
certificates for the Southern States certifying to a ratification were not legally-
elected or qualified Stated officers authorized to make such certificates, but
were usurpers professing to occupy such offices under the military power of
the United States, under the holding of Leser v. Garnett, the courts are unable
to question whether the officers of the State who sent certifications to the Secre-
tary of State certifying the ratification were duly authorized to do so.
47. 65 STAT. 710, 1 U. S. C. § 106 (b) (1951).
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At the time of the Proclamation, New Jersey had withdrawn its
ratification because of the unlawful action of Congress in purported-
ly unseating Senator John P. Stockton by a majority vote; whereas,
having been duly seated, Section 5 of Article I of the Constitution
Tequired a 2/3 vote to expel. Yet we are told that the same Congress
by a majority vote in making a so-called "political" decision will be
the sole judge of its own misconduct, in open and flagrant violation
of the Constitution, when the rights of citizens and the rights of
States reserved by the 10th Amendment are involved.
DANGER TO OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Coleman v. Miller; Chandler v. Wise, and Leser v. Garnett, seem
to be decisive of the question as to a lack of authority in the Supreme
Court to decide whether an amendment has been legally adopted.
If it be so, the whole constitutional structure of the United States
is in serious danger and Congress should forthwith initiate the neces-
sary adtion to give jurisdiction to the Courts to determine whether
an 'amendment has been legally adopted. Under the authority of
Coleman v. Miller; Leser v. Garnett, and Chandler v. Wise, any
political party which came to power in sufficient strength to propose
an amendment to the Constitution by a 2/3 vote could propose an
amendment to abolish all other political parties for the style of Gov-
ernment we see in many foreign countries. A mere Proclamation of
one man (Administrator of General Services Administration) that
such amendment had been adopted by 3/4 of the States would make
it an incontestable amendment despite the fact that not a single State
actually ratified. In similar fashion, the provisions of Section 1,
Article II, of the Constitution, which fixes the term of office of the
President at four years, could quickly be amended to a term for life;
thus a dictator could be born. In like manner, it would be a simple
matter to withdraw from the Courts the power to declare an Act of
the President or of Congress a violation of the Constitution. An
amendment might abolish the sovereignty of the States and leave but
one Federal Government. This sort of thing can be anticipated in
time of great National stress as the panacea for the Nation's ills.
Perhaps such a bold attempt to change the Constitution by the
mere false certification by the Administrator of General Servicets
Administration would bo too unpalatable to the public conscience, as
would be the military invasion by Federal troops of States having
recalcitrant Legislatures. But a recourse to a pretense of ratification
could more readily be procured by the organization of "Rump" Legis-.
latures composed of henchmen of the Federal Executive. Such
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"ratifications" would thereupon be accepted by the "political" decision
of the Congress based on a majority voice vote. There is no legal
difference in such action from what was done in respect to the 14th
Amendment. And the Supreme Court has declined to afford to the
citizens or the States protection from such usurpation of power under
the pretext that these are "political" questions.
No such ability to change our form of Government through the
will of a majority in Congress was ever intended by those who framed
the Constitution. Checks and balances should be restored, so this
cannot happen.
It may be said by short-sighted persons now that it is preposterous
to suggest that some Congress in the future might pass Amendments
to the Constitution to abolish all political parties other than the one
in power and to change the tenure of office of the President to life
instead of four years, by the simple expedient of Congress by Joint
Resolution declaring the Amendments to be adopted followed by a
certification to that effect by the Administrator of General Services
Administration. However, such unforseen things have happened be-
fore.4 8 It would be much wiser to preclude such a possibility now
than to regret its occurrence later.
REMXDIS
It would serve no useful purpose to discuss the correctness of the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Leser v. Garnett and Coleman v.
Miller other than to mention that in the latter case there wasa dissent
by Justices Butler and McReynolds. There is a long line of decisions
of the Supreme Court on questions that it considered not to be justici-
able because they were "political"; most of them relating to foreign
affairs,49 but unfortunately it has also construed this particular area
as political and will consequently not entertain it as matters now
stand.
48. When the 16th Amendment to the Constitution, seeking to authorize the
United States to levy and collect taxes on incomes of citizens, was being de-
bated in Congress, one of the Senators warned the Senate that if they passed
this proposed Amendment they might conceivably some day see income taxes
levied for as high as 20%, which would be confiscatory. At that time, the
argument was answered by the assertion that it was preposterous for anyone
to suggest that income taxes might ever be levied as high as 20% and that no
right-thinking person could ever believe this would ever happen as the voters
would defeat any legislator who voted for such a high tax; yet today the aver-
age person pays that much and some pay as high as 91%.
49. Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalI. 199 (1796); U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat 610
(1818); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1
(1849); Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635 (1853); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S.
270 (1902) ; Pacific States Telegraph v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912). See
also "The Doctrine of Political Questions", 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485 (1924);
"Political Questions", 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 (1925).
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In order to reestablish the traditional checks and balances in this
area between the three Departments of the Government, as designed
by our founding fathers and destroyed by the 39th and 40th Con-
gresses, it is imperative that the legality of the adoptions of Consti-
tutional amendments be subjected to judicial scrutiny.
The Congress could, of course, by ordinary Act, by majority vote
of both Houses, and signature of the President, confer jurisdiction
on the Courts of the United States and the Supreme Court to make
a determination whether an Amendment to the Constitution has been
adopted.
Whether an Amendment to the Constitution has been adopted is
actually a mixed question of law and fact, or at worst a mixed question
of law, fact, and politics. That the Congress has the power to
authorize the courts to determine such question was decided by the
Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden,50 which related to the provision
of the Constitution in which the United States guarantees to each
State a- republican form of government. In a unanimous opinion,
written by Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
Under this article it rests with Congress to decide what Gov-
ernment is the established one in a State. For as the United
States guarantee to each State a republican government, Con-
gress must necessarily decide what government is established
in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or
not.
So, too, as relates to the clause in the above-mentioned arti-
cle of the Constitution, providing for cases of domestic violence.
It rested with Congress, too, to determine upon the means proper
to be adopted to fulfill this guaranty. They might, if they had
deemed it most advisable to do so, have placed it in the power
of a court to decide when a contingency had happened which
required the federal government to interfere. (Writer's em-
phasis).
The relative ease by which a remedy is obtainable by Act of Con-
gress loses its attractiveness, however, when it is realized that such
Act could be repealed with equal ease by the same wilful, short-
sighted men against whom protection is sought. The only remedy
which would reestablish the checks and balances contemplated by the
framers of the Constitution with safety against a wilful Congression-
50. 7 How. 1 (1849).
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al majority would be an Amendment to Article V of the Constitution,
conferring on the judiciary the authority to determine whether an
Amendment has been adopted. In my opinion the heritage of our
Constitutional form of Government will be in danger of destruction
until such an Amendment to the Constitution is adopted.
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